I. Introduction
In this paper, we discuss the evolution of central bank interactions since the early 1970s
following the breakdown of the managed exchange-rate system that was negotiated at Bretton Woods. We focus not only on how central banks interact with one another in normal times, but also on how they behave during times of crisis. Today, central banks have more forums in which they interact without finance ministries than they did in earlier times, reflecting the fact that the focus of interactions has shifted away from managing exchange rates and toward monitoring and regulating the international financial system, global financial institutions, and cross-border capital flows. 1 At the same time, the rise in statutory independence has given central banks more authority to shape the response to events, and the rise of new powers and their integration in markets has resulted in the broadening out of the prominent coordinative groupings to include countries outside the historically traditional major powers. Within this context, our main conclusion is that the relationship-building that is inherent in multilateral interaction has provided a springboard for coordination in times of stress or crisis. 2 Moreover, crises matter in that they can be turning points in terms of the actions taken and the countries included in the dialogue; thus, the groupings themselves are to some extent endogenous to events. During the gold standard and the Bretton Woods period, central bank coordination was typically bilateral and involved the provision of liquidity to support the convertibility of currencies and maintenance of the exchange-rate system. 4 Following the end of managed exchange rates in 1973, central banks shifted their focus to achieving price stability and, during the 1990s, began to orient their monetary policies around inflation targeting-a framework which did not require cooperation per se (although central banks continued to meet and discuss their policies and objectives). 5 By the end of the 1990s, inflation targeting had been adopted not only by advanced economies but by many developing and emerging market countries as well. Over the same period, with the increase in financial liberalization and capital flows, central bank cooperation was expanded to include the codification of standards and rules aimed at ensuring the safety and soundness of the international financial system. Since the global financial crisis that began in 2007, much more talk among central banks has been dedicated to discussions of financial stability.
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It is perhaps no surprise that we have seen such large historical shifts in central bank interactions.
How scholars have interpreted these interactions has changed over time. Papers on multilateral interactions typically differentiate the types of those interactions into categories, with no two studies using an identical taxonomy. For example, Bergsten and Henning (1996, p. 13) distinguish between cooperation and coordination, where the former refers to "all collaborative activities among governments" and the latter is the subset of cooperative activities that involves the "mutual adjustment of national economic policies." Cooper (2006) defines central bank cooperation as having six facets: sharing information; standardizing concepts; exchanging views on global economic developments and the objectives of central bank policy; discussing the economic outlook; standardizing concepts with a possible adjustment of regulations; and agreeing to joint actions. James (2013) sees the progression from collaboration (pure information exchange); to discursive cooperation (discussion of policy objectives or technical issues); to instrumental cooperation (actions that are made more credible because they are undertaken jointly); to coordination (an extreme form of instrumental cooperation in which the action would not have been undertaken in ordinary circumstances but supports a shared longerterm goal).
In our view, the activities specified by the various taxonomies can be broadly classified into two types: relationship-building and joint actions. 7 Relationship-building, which we term 5 For a description of the inflation targeting framework, see Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) . 6 Balls, Howat, and Stansbury (forthcoming) discuss the implications of the broadening of central bank remits for institutional design and independence. 7 Our classification is similar to the one adopted by Borio and Toniolo (2006) who distinguish between information exchange (which they term "low-key cooperation") and joint decisions or actions ("high-profile cooperation").
"diplomacy," includes all forms of public and non-public information exchange-discussions of: current economic conditions, the economic outlook, statistical models of the economy, or statistics. Diplomacy develops in international forums that build knowledge, professional relationships, and trust. We see joint actions such as standard or rule setting, foreign-exchange market intervention, and liquidity provision, as "coordination." Although coordination does not necessarily occur only in times of crisis, relationships built through diplomacy lay the ground work for coordination when a crisis occurs.
Most central bank interactions-whether they be in forums exclusive to central banks or joint with finance ministries-are an example of "minilateralism" as defined in Hampson and Heinbecker (2011) . In minilateralism, "cooperation is promoted and advanced through smaller group interactions that typically involve the most powerful actors in the international system" (p.
301). 8 Our study follows this model; therefore, we focus on central banks in the advanced economies and, more recently, those in major emerging market economies. The decisions that arise from these minilateral forums can be seen as a type of "soft law" in that these forums generally have no formal rules of membership, are granted no specific authority, and have no formal decision-making processes or procedures for resolution of disputes. 9 One example of soft law is the G-5's Plaza Accord in 1985, which had no binding legal standing, but whose announcement has been interpreted as a public commitment device to lower the value of the US dollar through concerted foreign-exchange intervention.
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The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we discuss the most important forums or organizations through which central banks have engaged in diplomacy. We then discuss the mobilization of coordination through diplomacy using three examples over the past 30 years: the Plaza Accord in 1985 negotiated by the G-5; the response to the Asian financial crisis in 1997-
98, led by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with heavy participation from G-7 finance
8 Hampson and Heinbecker (2011) note that these minilateralist forums tend to be more decisive and efficient but less broadly accountable compared with large, more representative forums. "Plurilateralism" might be a better term, as the countries involved can be quite powerful and large-such forums are "mini" only in the sense that some countries have been excluded. 9 For a discussion of hard and soft law in international governance, see Abbott and Snidal (2000) . 10 Feldstein (1988, p. 10) argues that the system of government matters in that the separation of powers in the United States limits the authority of the US Treasury Secretary in international macroeconomic policy coordination relative to finance ministers from countries with parliamentary systems, particularly with respect to federal spending or taxes.
ministries and central banks; and the response to the global financial crisis that began in 2007. In each of these examples, we provide the economic circumstances at the time, discuss how the response was mobilized, and evaluate its success. An important take-away is that the major diplomacy bodies have tended to evolve in the aftermath of crises. In the concluding section, we use the lens of diplomacy and coordination to trace out the path for central bank diplomacy going forward.
II. Diplomacy
"Diplomacy is the art of telling people to go to hell in such a way that they ask for directions."
There are a multitude of international forums in which central banks participate, some of them high-profile (for example, G-7 or G-20 meetings of finance ministers and central bank governors) and others that are more private and less subject to public scrutiny (meetings at the central bank governors six times a year at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). He noted that these meetings were "of sufficient importance to the Fed that FOMC meetings are rescheduled to make sure they don't conflict." 11 In addition to meetings at the BIS, there were "international meetings that involve both central bank governors and finance ministers, including the G-20, which meets all around the world several times a year, G-7, the other Gs, and also, of course, the IMF meetings typically here in Washington and sometimes elsewhere, where you gather together the policymakers from the finance ministries and central banks from around the world" as well as "many other forms of consultation, calls, conference calls, bilateral calls, bilateral meetings, staff meetings, and the like." Not only were these consultations extensive, but they also included a discussion of prospective policies, not just of actions already taken, so that "policies are not made in isolation"-a point that may not be entirely clear to the general public.
11 Bernanke (2015b 14 In 1962, the members of WP3 met separately as the G-10 to establish the General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB), a set of bilateral standing arrangements that provided the IMF with additional resources to lend (initially only to countries in the G-10) in extraordinary circumstances. 15 The BIS hosted that meeting of the G-10 and, according to Borio and Toniolo (2008, pp. 43-44) , central bank governors were already meeting regularly in Basel and the BIS provided technical and staff support for "an increasing number of official and semi-official 'groups,' sometimes made up of both government and central bank officials" from the 1950s
onward. Baker (2006) reports that finance ministries and central banks of G-10 countries met regularly from the early 1960s until the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1973.
Other G-groupings 16
The origin of the G-5 and later G-7 groupings dates to the spring of 1973 when the U.S. Treasury
Secretary met together with the finance ministers of France, West Germany, and the United Kingdom in the library of the White House to discuss the international financial system after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. In calling together the "Library Group," the U.S. was seeking a more candid and informal grouping less dominated by European countries than the G-10; at another meeting in the fall of 1973, which included the Japanese finance minister, the G-5 finance ministers agreed to meet regularly. Federal Reserve Chairman
Arthur Burns attended the next meeting and set a precedent for the inclusion of central bank governors. According to Baker (2006, pp. 24-25) , "the beginnings of the G-5 (later to become the G-7) process were heavily informal, somewhat ad hoc and had an incremental and evolutionary dynamic" that relied on "personal networks and shared understandings." The group issued no communiqués after its meetings until 1985-indeed, its meetings were held in secret.
Although the meetings of heads of state or government-known as "leaders' level" summitshad expanded to include Canada and Italy by 1975, the grouping of finance ministers and central bank governors did not meet as the G-7 until 1986.
A process to expand the club of finance ministers and central bank governors to include a broader set of countries began in the late 1990s at the behest of APEC leaders and President 15 Bergsten and Henning (1996) regard the formation of the G-10 as a victory for the Europeans who viewed the IMF as a US-dominated institution; extensions under the GAB were not an IMF decision. Switzerland did not join the GAB until 1964 (http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/groups.htm#G10). 16 For background on the assorted G-groupings, see Baker (2013) .
Clinton amid a financial crisis in Asia. 17 In 1998, ministers and governors convened a meeting of the G-22 (initially known as the "Willard Group" because their first meeting took place in the Willard Hotel in Washington, D.C.) to discuss prospective reforms to the architecture of the international financial system. 18 Over the course of 1998 and 1999, the G-22 and its various working groups made a number of proposals, including the creation of a Financial Stability Forum (FSF). The FSF was established by the G-7 in early 1999 "to ensure that national and international authorities and relevant international supervisory bodies and expert groupings can more effectively foster and coordinate their respective responsibilities to promote international financial stability, improve the functioning of the markets and reduce systemic risk" and, although initially convened at the G-7 level, was intended to become more inclusive over time.
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The FSF comprised representatives from not only finance ministries and central banks but also supervisory authorities and other financial authorities; a small secretariat for the FSF was housed at the BIS in Basel.
In addition, the G-7 tasked a somewhat larger group of countries with reviewing some of the G-22's proposals and this G-33 met twice in the spring of 1999. 20 Kharas and Lombardi (2012) report that efforts then began to transform the G-33 into a smaller, more manageable, and less Asian grouping that would, at the same time, satisfy the need for a forum broader than the seven industrial powers. 21 This was achieved in September 1999 when the G-7 finance ministers and central bank governors announced the formation of the G-20, 22 with their communiqué stating that this new forum would "broaden the discussions on key economic and financial policy issues among systemically significant economies and promote cooperation to achieve stable and 17 The G-7 leaders' summit expanded to eight members with Russia in the mid-1990s, but the grouping of finance ministers and central bank governors remained unchanged. 18 The G-22 added 15 countries to the G-7: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, and Thailand. The G-22 was intended from the start to be a temporary forum (http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/groups.htm#G22).
19 Communiqué (1999) . See Langdon and Promisel (2013) Canada (1999) . 24 Kirton (1999) writes: "One doubt arises from the view of some who see the G20 as part of the 'G7-ization' of the world. In this view, the G20 was born to legitimate G7 initiatives to the wider world, by securing a broader consensus for G7-generated ideas. The G20's eleven non-G7 members are thus destined to affect issues merely on the margin, to be informed of G7 initiatives, and to be given some semblance of participation. The G20 underscores the fact that the G7 does not want to leave the reform of the international financial system to the IMF Since that time, the BIS has facilitated central bank operations and provided the forum for a wide range of technical discussions about central banking issues. In the 1950s, the BIS acted as agent for the clearing and settling of intra-European payments in the European Payments Union proposed creating an international bank to "commercialize" the reparations payments. See Simmons (1993) and Toniolo (2005, chapter 2) for detailed accounts. By commercializing the payments, reparations would be separated from politics, something that appealed to private bankers. Simmons (1993, p. 393) writes that "The United States government opposed any bank that would simply be a funnel for German reparations to pay off American war loans." Toniolo (2005) explains that although there was no formal link between Germany's reparations payments and the debt the Allied countries owed the United States, a linkage might create a "united European front" that could demand a reduction or repudiate the debt. (EPU). 31 In the 1960s, the BIS was at the center of central bank efforts to keep the price of gold in the free market trading near its official price in the Bretton Woods system, provide a line of credit to the Bank of England to prop up the pound sterling, and monitor developments in the emerging Eurocurrency market. 32 As noted earlier, it was also during those years that the central bank governors of the G-10 countries began to hold regular meetings at the BIS to review economic developments and monetary policy; the BIS also acted as agent for the G-10's GAB.
In addition, in keeping with its historically European focus, the BIS played a central role in With the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1973, the BIS began to shift toward forums organized to address various financial-sector issues. Borio and Toniolo (2008) distinguish between crisis response, on the one hand, and work aimed at strengthening the financial system in order to make it less susceptible to crisis, on the other. The most prominent example of the latter during this period was the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), a standing committee established by, and originally reporting to, G-10 central bank governors. 34 The
Committee first met in February 1975 following the collapse of a German bank (Bankhaus Herstatt)-an event that raised concerns about the fragility of fast-growing international financial markets. Since that time, the committee has evolved into the primary forum for central banks 31 The EPU was the first multilateral arrangement for the clearing of payments related to international trade and was administered by the Organization of European Economic Cooperation in Paris, set up to assist the European recovery after World War II; see Triffin (1957) . 32 These are commonly known as the Gold Pool, the Sterling Group Arrangements, and the Standing Committee on the Eurocurrency Market, respectively. 33 Siegman (1994) lists the "European character" of the BIS as one of the reasons that the United States did not assume its seat on the BIS's Board until 1994 (both the Chair of the Federal Reserve Board and the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York hold seats on the Board of Directors). In the early 1990s, the institution began expanding to include a number of non-European central banks. According to Siegman (p. 900), America's decision to take up representation "was made in recognition of the increasingly important role of the BIS as the principal forum for consultation, cooperation, and information exchange among central bankers and in anticipation of a broadening of that role." 34 For a history of the BCBS's early years, see Goodhart (2011) . As evidence of the limited nature of international coordination at the time, reports that at the first meeting of the committee, none or hardly any of the participants around the table had met before.
and regulatory authorities to cooperate on banking supervisory matters. 35 Other BIS committees created during this period addressed payments and settlement systems, financial market functioning, and international banking statistics. To the extent that responsibility for these issues extended beyond central banks, the forums were opened up to other government authorities.
At times shifting from diplomacy to cooperation, these forums have yielded a number of wellknown agreements on minimum capital standards for banks, core principles for banking supervision, and principles for the operation of settlement systems. 36 Borio and Toniolo (2008, pp. 64-65) episodes since the end of the Bretton Woods system in which relationships created through diplomacy have provided a springboard for action, streamlining our discussion to focus as much as possible on the role played by central banks.
The Plaza Accord
The economic circumstances that propelled the dollar's exchange value upward in the early 1980s are clear: A substantial tightening in monetary policy from the Volcker-led Federal
Reserve beginning in fall 1979 combined with a doubling of the federal fiscal deficit as a share of GDP during the first Reagan Administration to push U.S. interest rates higher (both in level terms and relative to foreign interest rates), attracting flows of foreign capital into the United
States and appreciating the dollar. 37 Between July 1980 and June 1984-the peak of the differential between U.S. and foreign interest rates-the dollar appreciated 36 percent in nominal terms relative to other major currencies (the red line in Figure 1 ). Thereafter, the dollar continued to rise despite a moderation in the interest differential, peaking in March 1985 at a level almost 55 percent above its value in the summer of 1980. 38 The appreciation of the priceadjusted or "real" dollar mirrored that of the nominal dollar (the blue line). Williamson (1985) estimates that by late February or early March 1985, the dollar was more than 40 percent above its fundamental equilibrium value. It is no wonder then that the U.S. current account swung from near balance in 1981 to a deficit position that reached nearly 2½ percent of GDP by 1984 (see Figure 2 ), or that major corporations and business organizations engaged in international trade called initially for actions to reverse the dollar's rise and later on lobbied for protectionist measures.
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The U.S. Treasury made clear from early 1981 that it would take a "hands-off" approach to exchange-rate policy, consistent with the free-market, noninterventionist beliefs of its Undersecretary for Monetary Affairs, Beryl Sprinkel. 40 There would be no regularized intervention in foreign-exchange markets; intervention would occur only in the event of 37 Many studies provide detailed accounts of these economic developments; see Frankel (1994) and Bordo, Humpage, and Schwartz (2015) . 38 The rise between June 1984 and March 1985 is often viewed as a "bubble," because the movement in economic fundamentals over that period did not support the dollar's continued appreciation. 39 See the accounts in Destler and Henning (1989) and Frankel (1994) . 40 For in-depth descriptions of the political climate in the first Reagan Administration, see Destler and Henning (1989 ), Frankel (1994 ), and Truman (2016b Frankel, 1994) . While Feldstein made his views known, he had no formal authority over budget or exchange-rate policy. Bordo, Humpage, and Schwartz (2015) observe that before 1985, there were few Administration officials who worried about the dollar's appreciation because they viewed the crowding out of exports that resulted as preferable to the traditional form of crowding out that results from an increase in the fiscal deficit. As evidence, the authors (p. 273) point to the CEA's 1984 Economic Report of the President as suggesting "that the investment sector contributed more to potential economic growth than the traded-goods sector, and that higher potential growth eased inflationary conditions." 43 See Volcker and Gyohten (1992), pp. 238-239; Truman (2016a), p. 19; Truman (2016b) , p. 143. Destler and Henning (1989) argue that Volcker was reluctant to criticize the Treasury publicly because the Federal Reserve was being attacked for running a very stringent monetary policy. Bordo, Humpage, and Schwartz (2015, pp. 278-279) claim that Volcker "briefly considered, but rejected, intervening without the Treasury's participation," fearing a political backlash. The account in Volcker and Gyohten (1992) casts doubt on that view and suggests that Volcker would have been extremely reluctant to intervene without Treasury participation (see pp. 234-235). The legal authority for conducting foreign-exchange operations is in Section 14(1) of the Federal Reserve Act, which authorizes Federal Reserve Banks to buy and sell cable transfers in the open market; in its annual Authorization for Foreign Currency Operations, paragraph 1(A), the Federal Open Market Committee authorizes and directs the purchase and sale of "foreign currencies in the form of cable transfers through spot or forward transactions on the open market at home and abroad, including transactions with the U.S. Treasury, with the U.S. Exchange Stabilization Fund …" (Federal Reserve, 2016) . When the Federal Reserve Act was drafted in 1913, international currency transactions were carried out via cable. 44 In his address at a conference on the Plaza Accord, Volcker indicated that by the time the Accord was agreed, he thought a "sizable realignment" of the dollar was necessary and that he wanted to avoid a "free fall," which could be abrupt and disorderly. See Green (2016) .
French because, by this time, the Bundesbank had been intervening heavily to stem the fall in the German mark. 45 The leaders agreed to establish an inter-governmental working group to study the effectiveness of intervention; the report produced by the group, known as the Jurgensen report, was presented at the leaders' summit meeting in Williamsburg the following year.
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According to Truman (2016b) , the working group, which was composed of finance ministry and central bank representatives, met 10 times and produced more than a dozen studies on foreignexchange intervention-many of them written at the Federal Reserve. 47 A key question concerned the effectiveness of sterilized intervention-that is, intervention that does not alter the monetary base. 48 The working group's studies provided evidence that sterilized intervention can have small, transitory effects on exchange rates and that coordinated intervention was more powerful than intervention by a single country. Bordo, Humpage, and Schwartz (2015, pp. 277) write that around the time of the Jurgensen report, "the weight of the evidence [from the working group's studies as well as other research] did not rule out sterilized intervention, but it appeared to shift against a portfolio-balance channel and toward a narrowly defined signaling channel; that is, intervention as a signal of future monetary-policy changes." 49 Truman (2016b, pp. 140-143) sees the Jurgensen report as having "contributed to a better understanding in official circles of the distinction between sterilized and unsterilized intervention" and set the stage for later cooperation "in particular with respect to coordinated operations and signaling official attitudes to the market."
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The Plaza Agreement in 1985 is widely regarded as a success in terms of cooperation-Paul Volcker writes that it was the "most aggressive and persistent effort to guide exchange rates on 45 According to Bordo, Humpage, and Schwartz (2015) , "many countries" had been using nonsterilized intervention to put upward pressure on their currencies vis a vis the dollar. 46 The Report of the Working Group 1983 was written by the Working Group on Exchange Market Intervention, whose chair, Philippe Jurgensen, was a French Treasury official. 47 Eight of the studies were written by economists in the Federal Reserve System. See Henderson and Sampson, (1983) . 48 This was an important issue because some central banks would have been opposed to unsterilized intervention, which would have altered the monetary base and had implications for inflation-for example, selling dollars and buying foreign currencies would have increased the U.S. monetary base and put upward pressure on inflation at a time when the Federal Reserve was trying to reduce it. 49 See Dominguez (2008) for a discussion of sterilization and a more recent review of the efficacy of sterilized intervention; see also Frankel (2016) . 50 Frankel (2016, p. 56) See Bordo, Humpage, and Schwartz (2015) . Truman (2016a) terms the intervention "substantial," but does not see it as the trigger for the dollar's reversal. 56 Frankel (1994, p. 303) writes that "German authorities could claim credit for the reversal of [intervention] policy," but that Baker got all the credit instead. It should be noted that the dollar did reverse course and appreciated from late August until the time of the Plaza meeting in September.
recent remarks, James Baker referred to the "serious protectionist fever burning in Congress" as the impetus for the discussions and indicated that, at the beginning of the secret meetings, the other G-5 governments expressed "predictable skepticism" (Baker, 2016) . But Truman (2016b) reports that by the summer of 1985, Secretary Baker had the support of the U.S. Secretary of State and officials of the other G-5 governments to take action to bring the dollar down. 57 The communiqué issued at the end of the meeting stated:
58 "The Ministers and Governors agreed that exchange rates should play a role in adjusting external imbalances. In order to do this, exchange rates should better reflect fundamental economic conditions than has been the case. They believe that agreed policy actions must be implemented and reinforced to improve the fundamentals further, and that in view of the present and prospective changes in fundamentals, some further orderly appreciation of the main non-dollar currencies against the dollar is desirable. They stand ready to cooperate more closely to encourage this when to do so would be helpful."
The dollar fell sharply upon the Plaza announcement 59 but, by early October, had returned to the pace of steady, gradual depreciation that it had followed earlier in the year. Judged in terms of politics and coordination, the Plaza was a great success. If you view the entire year of 1985 as a "Plaza period," as Frankel does, then the sea-change in U.S. attitudes and subsequent coordinated actions that put the dollar on a downward path also make the Plaza a success. But for those who are skeptical that sterilized intervention can have lasting effects and who view the Plaza as a one-time event in September, then it is more difficult to see that the agreement produced more than a hiccup in the dollar's decline.
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Let's turn now to the Plaza Agreement as an example of coordination built through diplomatic relationships, and the role of central banks in it. First, there is no doubt that getting to Plaza required coordination and a working network of G-5 relationships. Obviously, the change in U.S. attitudes at the start of 1985 was fundamental; also fundamental was the extent of the dollar's overvaluation and the protectionist climate that it brought out. Second, as a result of Plaza, the diplomatic grouping of finance ministers and central bank governors was expanded in 57 Volcker reports that he was "not in on the ground floor" but "was brought into the discussions only in August, when the ideas were becoming more operational." See Volcker and Gyohten (1992), p. 242. 58 Announcement (1985) . According to Funabashi (1988) and Frankel (1994) , the deputies agreed to a "nonpaper" that specified a 10-12 percent depreciation of the dollar (with up to $18 billion in intervention). 59 The weighted-average dollar fell 4 percent on the day after the Plaza announcement. 60 For the skeptical view of Plaza's effects, see Feldstein (1988); Bordo, Humpage, and Schwartz (2015); and Taylor (2015) .
1986 to include Italy and Canada. Baker (2006, pp. 25-26) links the expansion of the G-5 grouping to the formal announcement of and publicity surrounding the Plaza Accord, which resulted in pressure to align the membership with that of the leaders' grouping. 61 Thus, the Plaza produced an evolution-albeit a small one-in a major diplomatic forum, a point that is central to our view that the forums are elastic to events.
Finally, central banks played a critical role in this episode through their contributions to the Jurgensen report and the execution of intervention operations, but their involvement in and support for the Plaza Agreement itself is more equivocal. Truman (2016b) reports that central banks were brought into the secret discussions late-around the time the deputies began discussing the operational issues associated with the planned intervention. Pöhl were both concerned that the dollar's decline could be rapid and unruly, and so insisted on the insertion of "orderly" in the Plaza announcement. 65 Destler and Henning (1989, p. 50) write that the "consensus over the desired direction of exchange rate movement evaporated" well 61 Until 1985, the G-5 meetings of finance ministers and central banks governors were not made public or covered by the press. The January 17, 1985 meeting marked the first issuance of a statement. Historical information is also provided in Bergsten and Henning (1996) , Kharas and Lombardi (2012) . 62 Funabashi (1988) reports that the very early discussions were done on a bilateral basis between the U.S. Treasury and the finance ministries of Japan and Germany. 63 Truman (2016b), p. 148. 64 Indeed, at the bottom of the statement, each country listed several goals. France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and United States specified stable prices, disinflation, or price stability as an objective, while Japan specified "the flexible management of monetary policy with due attention to the yen rate." 65 See Funabashi (1988) and Truman (2016a) . In Green (2016) , Volcker indicates that he had not been "an enthusiastic proponent" of the Plaza Agreement; he thought the dollar would depreciate on its own and wanted "to avoid a free fall."
before the end of 1985. 66 Secretary Baker continued to pursue an activist agenda of international coordination during Reagan's second term.
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Asian Financial Crisis and the Road to the G-20
The growing power of emerging markets during the 1990s created enormous strains for the guardians of the world's economic architecture. Globalization, combined with the rapid growth of international financial markets, brought new financial actors to the table and made diplomacy and coordination with those actors far more complex and consequential. Further, at times of crisis, these new rising powers would need to be part of the coordinated international response.
In particular, financial rescue packages for countries in trouble were growing in scale and becoming increasingly likely to outstrip the capacity of the IMF, acting alone, to address. These 68 In the early 1990s, the G-7 was the primary forum where emerging market issues were discussed. Still, the importance of bringing the major emerging market countries more fully to the table was increasingly recognized, and there were occasional efforts by the leading central banks to reach out to their emerging market counterparts. The focal point of outreach was Asia, where rapid growth was raising expectations that the region was set to play a leading role in the global 66 Pöhl was quoted in the Wall Street Journal two weeks after the Plaza Accord as saying that the level of the dollar was "acceptable to us" (Destler and Henning, 1989, p. 50) . Volcker was quoted in the Washington Post around the same time as saying "one could have too much of a good thing" (Truman, 2016b, p. 154) . 67 Secretary Baker wanted other major countries to stimulate their economies through monetary and/or fiscal policy, thereby increasing demand for U.S. exports and reducing the trade and current account deficits; an alternative to stimulative macroeconomic policies was a further depreciation of the dollar. From 1986, Baker pursued various other initiatives aimed at policy coordination. These included a set of objective macro indicators announced at the May 1986 G-7 leaders' summit (with the intention of setting goals for the indicator variables); the Baker-Miyazawa agreement announced later in 1986 (to stabilize the yen-dollar rate as a quid pro quo for Japanese fiscal expansion); the Louvre Accord in February 1987 intended to stabilize exchange rates near thencurrent levels (and that reportedly included target zones that were agreed but not announced). See Funabashi (1988) , Destler and Henning (1989), and Frankel (1994) . 68 The Federal Reserve facilitated the operation of the Exchange Stabilization Fund as part of the 1995 U.S. Treasury-and IMF-backed rescue package for Mexico, which also led to a rethink of the international financial architecture that played an important role in the central bank's response to the Asia crisis.
economy. Still, prior to the onset of the Asia crisis, the primary forums for central bank communication and diplomacy remained dominated by the industrial countries.
Among Asian central banks, there was a parallel effort during this period to strengthen regional cooperation, but the overall effect in terms of developing a regional voice was limited prior to the crisis. In addition to regional integration efforts oriented around the Association of South that warning signs had been apparent for some time not only in Thailand but throughout the region. A private sector-led investment boom during the 1990s fueled large increases in current account deficits, rising debt levels (much of it in foreign currencies and of short duration), and real appreciations that over time raised growing concerns about sustainability. 74 Most of the region had exchange rates that were effectively-even if not formally-fixed or semi-fixed.
This meant that as sentiment turned in late 1996 and early 1997, and capital flows began to reverse, exchange rates came under pressure (see Figure 3) . Further, close ties between banks and the firms that they lent to and expectations of state support further distorted incentives.
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Among policymakers, concerns were raised, though not with the strength and focus needed to mobilize action. Boughton (2012, chapter 11) argues that, beginning in 1995 and intensifying in late 1996-97, IMF management expressed their concerns privately to Asian policymakers and, in general terms, in a number of speeches. But such concerns, while often expressed, were not with the urgency needed to break through. It has often been noted that Asian policymakers saw little reason for concern. Decades of high growth rates had bred strong conviction in the success and stability of the "Asian economic miracle," and without the need for IMF resources there was a deep resistance throughout Asia to adopting IMF recipes.
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Investors began to turn against these countries in the summer of 1996, and the outflows of private capital intensified in September 1996, when Moody's Investors Service downgraded its rating on Thailand's short-term external debt. 77 Following the decision by Thailand to borrow from the IMF and float its currency in 1997, shockwaves spread quickly through the region, and Indonesia and the Philippines also had to turn to the IMF for financial assistance in the following months. As Truman (2013) aptly comments, "few anticipated that a crisis in Thailand would be as severe as it proved to be or the extent to which other countries in Asia had their own vulnerabilities and were susceptible to a change in investor appetites." 78 74 For example, see Camdessus (1997) . 75 In contrast with most developing country debt crises of the 1970s and 1980s, public sector deficits were not the primary problem in Asia. See, for example, Roubini and Setser (2004) . 76 See World Bank (1993) ; for a post-crisis assessment from the IMF, see Kato (2004) . 77 See Boughton (2012), chapter 11, and Blustein (2001) . See also the Nukul Commission report (1998), p. 43. 78 Truman (2013) In contrast, throughout the crisis, existing Asian central bank emergency swap lines were not activated, as the amounts available under the programs were small and the pressure to put together large, internationally supported packages led lending countries to rely on other approaches. Further, to some extent regional policymakers were overwhelmed by the scale of the crisis confronting them, making policy coordination challenging on a regional basis.
The next important step forward in central bank diplomacy took place in December 1997, with an extraordinary effort to coordinate a rollover of loans made by banks around the world to banks in Korea. The Korean crisis had built slowly over the summer as economic performance deteriorated and markets became extremely skittish over Korea's mounting foreign debt and large current account deficit, but it intensified following the floating of the Taiwan dollar and sharp sell-off in the Hong Kong stock market in mid-October. By the end of October, Korean equities were down 40 percent from early August, and the won was falling sharply against the dollar. The rout was on.
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An initial IMF program, totaling $21 billion over three years, was announced on December 7, and the announcement stressed that, with bilateral assistance, the package would total $55 billion. Still, the initial disbursement was small-$5.6 billion-and questions were immediately raised about the overall adequacy of financing; a tightly contested election campaign in Korea 79 That commitment never materialized, as financing needs were met multilaterally. 80 See Boughton (2012), pp. 544-545. raised questions about the durability of the program. The Korean central bank's reserves were falling by nearly $1 billion per day, a pace that would exhaust them by month-end. In drawing up a replacement program (eventually approved on December 30, 1997), policymakers decided that the official community was unwilling to finance the continued rapid outflow of capital.
On December 23, 1997, after a conference call of IMF management with the deputies of the G-7 finance ministers and central bank governors, it was decided that a standstill of commercial bank lines would need to be attempted. 81 According to Boughton (2012) , the subsequent public announcement indicated that "central banks would coordinate the debt rollovers internationally and make sure that aggregate exposure was being maintained." In the following days, U.S. Through the initial set of meetings, central banks largely remained in the shadows, concerned about their regulatory role and how such an explicit effort at moral suasion would be received.
But the operation of the rollover was the responsibility of central banks, which coordinated their efforts to press commercial banks in their jurisdiction to maintain exposure. The IMF's role in the standstill was to help the Bank of Korea develop a real-time monitoring system to track the amount of debt that was maturing each day, along with the amount that was being rolled over.
Once that data was collected and analyzed, a daily conference call took place to brief central bank representatives. While the initial data was suspect, within a week the data was strong enough to support a substantial central bank moral suasion effort, and capital flows quickly stabilized and rollover rates rose steadily over the next few months. 83 In addition, the substantial package of economic measures that the Korean government undertook contributed to the restoration of confidence, paving the way for an agreement converting $22 billion in short-term interbank claims into bonds with maturities of one to three years, which were fully guaranteed by 81 In this situation, a standstill involved convincing banks outside Korea to roll over maturing lines of credit to Korean banks. 82 Blustein (2001), Rubin and Weisberg (2003) . 83 Based on Robert Kahn's recollection of events from his experience as an IMF staffer who helped to develop the real-time monitoring system. See also Boughton (2012), pp. 564-565, and Blustein (2001) .
the Korean government. The exchange normalized Korea's debt and allowed the country to return to the debt market in April 1998.
Although we leave aside examples from other regions, Asian efforts at regional cooperation have been highly visible and important; the crisis catalyzed a significant effort among Asian central banks to expand regional diplomacy. This impetus reflected a number of factors. Within Asia, there was a belief that a strong regional response was needed to avoid the sort of contagion that had been experienced during the Asian financial crisis and ensure that Asian countries "never again" would need to turn to the IMF for emergency support. The crisis had created a new appreciation that shocks affecting one country could spill over quickly to others in the region.
Increased dependence on foreign capital and bank loans, as well as underdeveloped domestic financial markets, were seen as creating unique regional vulnerabilities from global swings in capital flows. At the same time, the strengthening of regionalism around the world, including the launch of the euro in 1999 and trade integration in the Americas, reinforced the acceptability of regional arrangements.
This pressure for regional solutions was reflected in a number of dimensions. In the fall of 1997, Japan's Vice Minister for International Finance, Eisuke Sakakibara, proposed the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) with an initial $100 billion to provide trade finance and balance of payments support to the Asian economies. 84 This represented an attempt by Japan to take the lead in creating a new regional financial institution that would not, at least initially, include the United States. But the effort was poorly prepared and ran into strong opposition particularly from the United States, which was concerned that the new agency would undermine the influence of the IMF, and from Germany, which was concerned about the moral hazard created if financing to avoid balance of payments adjustment was too readily available.
Following the failure of this effort, subsequent regional coordination initiatives were more carefully designed to be complementary to, rather than competitive with, existing international bodies. At a November 18-19, 1997, meeting of Asian-Pacific finance ministry and central bank deputies, 85 agreement was reached on the "Manila Framework" that explicitly acknowledged the 84 This occurred shortly after the "Friends of Thailand" meeting and with the group's support. See Kawai (2015) . 85 Fourteen countries attended, including from outside Asia the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. limited the perceived value for addressing pure liquidity crises, but reflected the judgment that the CMI lacked the ability to perform independent and credible surveillance and monitoring. At the same time, an increase in the resources available to the IMF and new flexibility in its lending 86 The Manila Framework proposed three areas for regional cooperation: (1) a regional surveillance mechanism; (2) technical cooperation to improve domestic regulations and financial systems; and (3) a financing mechanism called the Cooperative Financing Arrangement (CFA). 87 See Jung (2008) . The development of regional financial markets, which were seen as backward and inefficient and leading to dependence on funding from abroad, was the focus of EMEAP and ASEAN+3 initiatives. While there has been rapid growth in these markets in subsequent years, some have questioned how much credit should be given to these efforts. 88 See Henning (2002) , chapter 3, for details. 89 Joint Ministerial Statement (2000) . 90 Henning (2002, p. 13) notes that, "With ASEAN and South Korea, the total reserves of the "10 plus 3" countries were $729 billion, which did not include Hong Kong or Taiwan's foreign exchange reserves, nor ASEAN+3's noncurrency reserves, such as gold, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), and reserve positions in the IMF." Table 3 .1 indicates that the size of each bilateral currency swap ranged from $1 to $3 billion. 91 The amount that can be drawn without IMF review has now been increased to 30 percent. Asia. In each of these cases, the job of furthering regional cooperation fell primarily to the central banks, albeit with strong political support from their sovereigns.
The Global Financial Crisis
Much as has been written about the global financial crisis (GFC), yet the origins of and lessons to be drawn from the deepest crisis the global economy has seen since the Great Depression are still being debated. For the purposes of this paper, one point on which there is agreement is that the policy response required an extraordinary degree of central bank coordination, brought forth a comprehensive rewrite of the playbook for dealing with financial crises, and will have implications for how central banks operate (and relate to each other) for generations to come.
The onset of the GFC began in summer 2007, when a collapse in confidence by investors in the value of sub-prime mortgages led to a credit crunch and liquidity crisis in global capital markets. 94 As the crisis deepened and spread-reflecting the unwinding of a credit boom combined with excessive leverage, underpricing of risks, and insufficient risk managementcentral banks responded with increasing urgency, providing liquidity, slashing interest rates, and 92 In 2002, the IMF introduced "exceptional access" rules allowing lending in excess of normal lending limits subject to conditions. 93 Since its creation in 2000, the CMI has been enlarged and converted into a multilateral facility: it was multilateralized-that is, converted into a reserve pooling arrangement known as the CMIM, with $120 billion in resources. In 2012, CMIM resources were increased to $240 billion and members are now permitted to draw up to 30 percent of quota without an IMF program. 94 Many date the start of crisis from August 9, 2007, when interbank markets seized up following BNP Paribas' announcement that it was suspending redemptions in three of its investment funds because of a collapse in the liquidity of subprime mortgage assets.
undertaking asset purchase programs in order to stabilize financial conditions, restore market functioning, and stimulate economic activity. 95 In this account, we separate the discussion into conventional monetary policy actions, actions related to market functioning and liquidity provision, and unconventional policies; we find the functional approach in this case to be more informative than the chronological narrative we used for outlining the two previous coordination episodes.
The onset of the GFC quickly led central banks to recognize that cooperation and coordination among central banks around the world was necessary and needed new impetus. The success of the swap lines in mitigating funding pressures and reducing interbank borrowing rates is considered one of the major successes from central bank coordination during the crisis.
In addition to easing funding shortages, these swaps also contributed to an alleviation of market fears and sent a strong signal that central banks were prepared to move outside of their comfort zone to address financial stress. In this regard, it is worth noting that three emerging market central banks participated in these arrangements (Brazil, Korea, and Singapore 110 In announcing the program, the Fed said: "This action is being taken to reduce the cost and increase the availability of credit for the purchase of houses, which in turn should support housing markets and foster improved conditions in financial markets more generally." See Federal Reserve (2008b) . 111 See Habermeier and Mancini Griffoli (2013 ) and IMF (2013a , 2013b for discussion of these programs and their effects.
communication about the expected path of policy interest rates (known as forward guidance).
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Although central banks have not directly coordinated these unconventional policy actions, they have continued to rely on diplomacy to inform and discuss these actions in international forums.
Throughout governance. There was debate over whether some new grouping could be created, but the 112 Canada and the United States are notable examples. 113 For example, see Hilsenrath (2012) , Hilsenrath and Blackstone (2012) . 114 Rajan (2013 The case studies presented in this paper-the Plaza Accord, the Asian financial crisis, and the
Global Financial Crisis-demonstrate clearly that while central bank thinking evolves and adapts over time to changing global circumstances, financial and economic crises serve as, in Caruana's words, "as catalysts for change." Repeatedly during the post-war period, crises have led to 115 Leadership of the G-20 rotates among countries, and the staff from the prior-, current-, and next-year host countries form a secretariat that prepares for the ministerial meetings. 116 Some credit that first G-20 leaders' summit as the impetus behind the coordinated interest rate cuts. Angeloni and Pisani-Ferry (2012, pp. 15-16) write that the communiqué conveyed "a sense of urgency, focus, and concreteness that could not be found in the traditional G7/G8 declarations. Instead of broad, often nebulous, open-ended political declarations encompassing a wide range of topics, it reads like what it is-an extremely focused action plan… the language is precise, even technical-specialised institutions in charge of carrying out work… are named and they are given strict deadlines for implementation." 117 Langdon and Promisel (2013) Getting that balance right has, if anything, become more challenging in recent years. As noted earlier, central banks were drawn into a wider range of activities during and in the aftermath of the GFC, some of which had a quasi-fiscal character or involved unconventional policies that were introduced when policy interest rates neared zero. As a consequence, central banks have arguably acquired a wider range of powers in the areas of unconventional monetary policy, crisis response, and financial stability. These wider powers have challenged conventional wisdom about how central banks should operate and, in some countries, resulted in political backlash.
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While it is a fool's errand to try and predict the next crisis, there is accumulating evidence that we are now more interconnected, that financial channels transmit shocks across national borders more widely and with more power than in the past, and that as a consequence the spillovers from shocks abroad will become even more consequential. 121 This has implications for financial 118 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) for the argument that when credible central banks are following optimal policies, the gains from policy coordination are small, and Taylor (2013) for why unconventional monetary policies arising from the GFC have created the potential for additional coordination gains. 119 A good example is the response to the 2016 British referendum-Brexit-that produced a majority vote in favor of exiting the European Union. Following the vote on June 23, central banks moved quickly and in a clearly coordinated fashion. Bank of England Governor Mark Carney signaled to financial markets the Bank's willingness to "take all necessary steps to meet its responsibilities for monetary and financial stability" and hinted at possible future monetary easing (see www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/calendar/default.aspx). The SNB and a number of emerging market central banks reportedly intervened in foreign exchange markets. Other leading central banks including the Bank of Japan, ECB, and Federal Reserve signaled that they were closely monitoring developments in global financial markets and were prepared to address liquidity needs. 120 See Balls et al. (2016) for a comprehensive review. 121 For example, a recent IMF (2016, chapter 2) report finds, unsurprisingly, that trade and financial integration of emerging market economies into the global economy and financial system has increased significantly over the past regulation, which is dealt with elsewhere in this volume. But it also has important implications for monetary policy at the leading central banks and suggests a potentially more significant role for central bank diplomacy in the years to come.
two decades, and that the financial spillovers to industrial countries from shocks in emerging market (particularly China) are more substantial and complex than previously understood. 
